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Introduction 
Does morality have a function in the teleological sense of that term and, if so, what is 
that function? When I ask the question ‘what is the function of morality?’ I mean the 
term ‘function’ to be understood in teleological terms. Thus, the function of morality is 
a matter of what morality is ‘for’, what its purpose is, or what goal it is designed to 
achieve. According to the dominant answer to that question within both philosophy 
and cognitive science morality does indeed have a function and that function is to 
facilitate cooperation. My goal in this chapter is to raise some sceptical doubts about 
this answer through the examination of an important version of it that has recently 
been developed by Michael Tomasello in his book A Natural History of 
Human Morality. But before launching directly into Tomasello’s work it is important 
to have a solid understanding of the nature of morality, on the one hand, and of 
function, on the other.  
Morality and moral judgment 
Moral evaluation is a prominent feature of human life; we frequently morally evaluate 
our own actual and potential behaviour and that of our fellows. When we do this we 
make a moral judgement. Such judgements are often given a linguistic expression that 
utilises such normative terms as ‘ought’, ‘should’, ‘right’, ‘wrong’, ‘good’, ‘bad’, ‘fair’, 
‘unfair’, and so on. For example, one might say ‘you shouldn’t have stolen that book 
from the library’ or  ‘it is a good thing to donate to charity.’ Moral judgment is a human 
universal; it takes place in all cultures and is done by all normal people1 and we begin 
doing it very early in our lives.2 It is also probably unique to humans as not even higher 
primates such as chimps make moral judgements.3 When I talk about ‘morality’ in this 
1 R. Joyce, The Evolution of Morality, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 2006. 
2 P. Bloom, Just Babies: The Origins of Good and Evil, London, Bodley Head, 2013. 
3 M. Tomasello, A Natural History of Human Morality, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 
2016. 
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chapter I am referring to the human capacity to make moral judgements and the 
mental machinery that directly supports that capacity. 
As the capacity to make moral judgements is central to morality then the question 
is raised as to the nature of moral judgement. In the case of some types of mental 
states there is a distinction between occurrent and standing states. For example, I 
believe that Henry James wrote The Portrait of a Lady, a belief that I have held for 
some time and continue to hold even when I am not actively considering the 
proposition that Henry James wrote The Portrait of a Lady. As Prinz4 would put it, this 
belief is stored in my long-term memory and is a dispositional or standing belief. In the 
situation where I actively consider the proposition that Henry James wrote The Portrait 
of a Lady and commit myself to its truth (for example, in response to someone asking 
me who wrote The Portrait of a Lady) then my belief is an occurrent belief and this 
state involves the activation of the corresponding standing belief stored in long term 
memory. It is plausible to say that the occurrent/standing distinction applies to moral 
judgement in that the active moral judgements that we make when confronted by 
certain behaviour or when planning our actions often reflect deeper seated 
commitments that persist over a period of time whilst we are not actively making such 
judgments. Thus, for example, the vegetarian who actively judges that it would be 
wrong to eat the ham sandwich just offered to them is drawing upon a long-term 
conviction that it is wrong to eat meat.  
The most important feature of moral judgements relates to their normative 
character. Suppose that someone makes the moral judgement that eating meat is 
wrong. In doing this they are not making a straightforward factual claim as to how 
people generally behave. Few people who judge that eating meat is wrong are under 
the impression that people do not generally eat meat. Indeed, many of our moral 
judgements are negative: they involve evaluating someone for not behaving in a 
particular way. Thus, moral judgments are inherently normative: one is not judging 
how things are but how things ought to be or how people ought to behave.  
But what is involved in judging that one ought to behave in a particular way even if 
people do not generally behave in that way? The immediate difficulty in answering this 
4 J. Prinz, Furnishing the Mind, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 2002. 
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question is that not all apparently normative judgements are on the same footing. 
Sometimes judgments that we express using words such as ‘should’ and ‘ought’ are 
prudential as when I tell a student who has asked me how to get an A grade in their 
next essay that they ought to read more widely and engage in deeper analysis of the 
texts they discuss. When I do this I am saying that in order to achieve their goal it is 
necessary to do what I advise, that it would be prudent to do what I advise if they have 
the goal in question. The key point is that I’m not implying that they are under any 
obligation to do what I advise independently of their goal to get an A; if they drop that 
goal then my advice is no longer relevant to them. But, as Kant5 emphasised, moral 
judgments are not conditional in that way; when we make a moral judgment we are 
judging how people ought to behave whatever their goals.  
This might appear to imply that moral judgments are connected to legal laws or 
social conventions so that making a moral judgement is akin to making a judgement 
about what the law or social convention requires. For, people sometimes violate the 
demands of the law or social convention but if a person doesn’t care about the law or 
social convention then that does not imply that they do not apply to them.6 
Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to equate moral judgments with judgments about 
the law or judgments about the operative social conventions. We do typically demand 
of the law that it engages with morality; for example, the moral wrongness of rape is a 
very good reason for making rape a crime. However, morality is independent of the 
law in the respect that much of the law does not relate to moral matters. Moreover, it 
is commonplace and perfectly coherent to judge that a particular type of behaviour has 
a particular moral status (negative or positive) while the law does not engage with it 
(for example, having an affair when one is in a long-term relationship). Similarly, it is 
commonplace and perfectly coherent to judge as morally legitimate a type of behaviour 
that you know to be illegal (as, for example, many liberal people did in the United 
Kingdom prior to the decriminalisation of homosexual acts between men in 1967). 
5 I. Kant, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, A. Zweig (trans), Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 1785/1998. 
6 P. Foot, ‘Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives’ in Philosophical Review, 81, 3, 1972, 
305-316.
4	
With respect to social conventions similar points can be made. Although one might 
judge that we have a moral duty to follow social conventions (perhaps, because to fail 
to do so would upset our fellows or undermine social cohesion)  it is commonplace 
and perfectly coherent to judge a type of behaviour as morally legitimate even though 
it violates social convention (for example, having children out of wedlock, or men 
wearing dresses) or regard it as morally problematic even though it is demanded by 
social convention (for example, addressing a woman by means of a title that reflects 
her marital status). Indeed, classic research in developmental psychology has 
established that early in their development children draw a distinction between the 
moral and the conventional domains.7 In short then, moral judgements are inherently 
normative but the normatively involved is distinct from that connected with prudence, 
social convention and legality.  
A third feature of moral judgements relates to their impartial character; when we 
make a moral judgement we commit to holding everyone in the relevant group, 
including ourselves, to the same standards. Thus, one cannot coherently judge that 
everyone apart from oneself ought to pay tax or that it is wrong for anyone apart from 
oneself to eat meat. That is not to say that one cannot morally excuse an individual on 
a particular occasion but any such exceptions need to be principled as when one 
excuses someone who steals when they had no alternative way of providing for their 
hungry children.  
A fourth feature of moral judgements is that they generally have a strong 
motivational force; as Richard Joyce8 puts it, they have ‘practical clout’. Thus, for 
example, if someone judges that eating meat is wrong then they are generally 
motivated to avoid eating meat and to respond to others who eat meat by criticising, 
shunning or punishing them. For those committed to moral judgement internalism 
(such as Michael Smith9) this relationship between moral judgment and motivation is 
7 E. Turiel, The Development of Social Knowledge: Morality and Convention, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1983. 
8 Joyce, The Evolution of Morality, 57. 
9 M. Smith, The Moral Problem, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1994. 
	 5	
necessary whereas for moral judgment externalists such as Shafer-Landau10 the link 
is contingent. I will not take a stand on this issue in the context of this chapter.  
A fifth feature of moral judgements is that they are strongly connected to our 
emotions. Put bluntly, we generally care about moral matters so that we often feel guilt 
or shame when we judge we have done something wrong and feel angry or indignant 
towards those those we judge to have done wrong. Once again, there is a debate as 
to whether or not this link is necessary or contingent with philosophers influenced by 
Hume on the one side11 regarding it as necessary and their opponents12 regarding it 
as contingent. I won’t take a stand on this issue here.  
A sixth feature of moral judgement relates to their interpersonal nature.  We do 
sometimes make moral judgements that relate to the conduct of the individual in 
isolation from other people, as when someone judges that a person has a moral 
obligation not to waste their talents. However, moral judgement generally relates to 
how individuals ought to engage with their fellows. Indeed, Joyce13 goes so far as to 
say that a Robinson Crusoe would have no need for morality.14  
I do not pretend to have given an exhaustive account of the nature of moral 
judgement in this section but I take myself to have made a number of points that are 
relatively uncontroversial and which collectively provide sufficient understanding of 
																																																						
10 R. Shafer-Landau, Moral Realism: A Defence, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003. 
 
11 For example, S. Nichols, Sentimental Rules:  The Natural Foundations of Moral Judgment, Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2004 and J. Prinz, The Emotional Construction of Morals, Cambridge, MA, 
MIT Press , 2007. 
 
 
12 For Example, J. Mikhail, Elements of Moral Cognition, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
2011. 
 
13 Joyce, The Evolution of Morality. 
 
14 See B. Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 
1985 and T. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1998 
for important expressions of the view that moral judgement inherently concerns our interactions with 
our fellows.  
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what I mean by ‘morality’ when I raise the question as to the function of morality. It is 
now time to turn to the question of how we are to understand the term ‘function.’  
 
Functions 
The function of morality is a matter of what morality is ‘for’, what its purpose is, or what 
goal it is designed to achieve. This notion of function could do with some clarification. 
In recent philosophy, especially in the philosophy of mind and in discussions of the 
explanation of complex capacities, the term ‘function’ is often not understood in a 
teleological manner. For example, when philosophers of mind attempt to characterise 
types of mental state in functional terms what they mean by ‘functional’ has to do with 
causation.15 Thus, a functionalist about pain is claiming that what makes a mental 
state pain has to do with its causes and effects rather than what it is for in any 
teleological sense.   And when Fodor,16 Dennett,17 and Cummins18 champion a form 
of explanation of the complex capacities of a system that involves decomposing the 
system into components that perform less complex functions than the system to which 
they belong, they understand the function of a component in terms of that aspect of 
what it does that contributes to the performance of the target capacity rather than what 
it is for. For example, explaining how an internal combustion engine works would 
involve identifying such parts as the cylinder, crankshaft, carburettor, and so on, and 
identifying what each of these parts does and how they interact so as to engender the 
overall behaviour of the engine.  
An obvious example of a function in an alternative teleological sense comes from 
the domain of artefacts. For example, the function of a kitchen knife is to cut food. The 
function of artefacts relates to what they are designed to do, made to do or, perhaps, 
used to do. This design, manufacture or use depends upon the mental states of some 
																																																						
15 N. Block, ‘Advertisement for a Semantics for Psychology’ in Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 10, 
1986, 615-678. 
 
16 J. Fodor, ‘The Appeal to Tacit Knowledge in Psychological Explanation,’ in Journal of Philosophy, 
65, 1968, 627-640. 
 
17 D. Dennett, Brainstorms, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 1978. 
18 R. Cummins, ‘Functional Analysis’, Journal of Philosophy, 72, 1975, 741-765. 
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intelligent designer, manufacturer or subsequent user. For example, a kitchen knife 
has the function of cutting food rather than some other function or no function at all 
because it was designed, manufactured or used with the intention of cutting food by 
some intelligent agent.  
However, it is possible to have a function in the teleological sense without being the 
product of intelligent design, manufacture or use. Ever since Darwin evolutionary 
biologists have attributed functions to the traits of organisms. For example, the function 
of the heart is to pump blood around the body and the function of the  zebra’s stripes 
is to camouflage it from potential predators.19 At first blush, such talk of function might 
seem odd given that one of Darwin’s20 central aims was to explain the complexity of 
organisms and why they are often so well-suited to the environmental niche that they 
inhabit without appeal to an intelligent designer.21 What solves the puzzle here is the 
so-called etiological account of function championed by Wright.22 23 The basic idea is 
that the function of a trait is a matter of the effects in virtue of which it was selected 
and continues to exist within the population. Consider an example. Suppose that as a 
result of genetic mutation an organism had a trait not possessed by its parents or most 
of the other members of its population. For example, suppose the organism was an 
insect that had a distinctive dark colouration.24 As a result of this colouration the insect 
																																																						
19 Actually, there is some controversy as to the function of the zebra’s stripes and recent research 
puts pressure on this familiar claim. For example, T. Caro, Zebra Stripes, Chicago, University of 
Chicago Press, 2016 argues that the function of the zebra’s stripes is to deter parasitic flies.   
20 C. Darwin, On the Origin of Species, London, John Murray, 1859. 
 
21 R. Dawkins, The Blind Watchmaker, New York, Norton, 1986; D. Dennett, Darwin’s Dangerous 
Idea, London: Penguin, 1995. 
 
22 L. Wright, ‘Functions’ in Philosophical Review, 82, 1973, 139-168. 
23 The etiological account has subsequently been developed by P. Godfrey-Smith, ‘Functions: 
Consensus Without Unity’, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 74, 1993, 196-208, P. Godfrey-Smith, ‘A 
Modern History Theory of Functions’ in Nous, 28, 1994, 344-362, K. Neander, ‘The Teleological 
Notion of “Function”’, in Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 69, 1991, 454-468, and R. Millikan, ‘In 
Defense of Proper Functions’ in Philosophy of Science 56, 1989, 288-302. For a helpful overview see 
P. Godfrey-Smith, Philosophy of Biology, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 2014 and K. 
Neander, ‘Does Biology Need Teleology’ in R. Joyce, (ed) The Routledge Handbook of Evolution and 
Philosophy, Abingdon, Routledge, 2018, 64-76. 
24 This example is modelled on that of the famous peppered moth.  
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was much harder to detect by predators and so lived for a longer period and had more 
offspring than it otherwise would have done. Moreover, it had a longer life and 
produced more offspring than its fellows with the alternative traditional light coloration. 
The offspring of the insect inherited the genetic basis of the dark colouration and so 
had the same colouration as their parent. This bestowed upon them a similar 
reproductive advantage so that the new dark colouration gradually became 
commonplace within the population. Thus, what explains why the dark colouration 
became widespread in the population and why it continues to persist many 
generations down the line has to do with its effects with respect to hiding the insect 
from predators. Thus, the function of this specific colouration is that of camouflaging 
the insect from predators and the trait has this function without the involvement of any 
intelligent designer. Of course evolution by natural selection is typically an incremental 
process with new mutations modifying traits that are based upon earlier mutations.  
This is somewhat obscured in the example of the insect as described thus far. But the 
darkening process could occur gradually as a first mutation led to an insect being 
slightly darker than its fellows, a subsequent mutation in a later generation causing a 
slightly darker colouration, and so on, with each step providing a defence against 
predation. In such a case, the colouration at each stage in the incremental process 
has the function of camouflaging the insect from predators.  
In the context of this chapter I’m going to accept the etiological account as a viable 
account of how traits get their function in the teleological sense of that term. My 
justification for this is that such an account strikes me as being tacitly endorsed by 
many of those prominent figures who discuss the function of morality. Moreover, the 
prominent objections expressed in the philosophical literature are not particularly 
germane. One such objection is that the teleological notion of function is explanatorily 
inert.25 For example, if we want to explain how the insect in the above example avoids 
being eaten by predators or how the heart pumps blood around the body, appealing 
to the selectional history of the insect or the heart is going to get us nowhere. Rather, 
what we need to appeal to are the intrinsic properties that ground the relevant causal 
powers. For example, suppose that an insect that is a molecule-for-molecule duplicate 
of the evolved dark insect spontaneously comes into existence in the manner of 
																																																						
25 R. Cummins, ‘Functional Analysis’, 1975. 
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Davidson’s swampman.26 The two insects will be just as effective at avoiding being 
eaten by predators and what explains this are factors such as their colouration, that of 
the surfaces on which they alight, the visual capacities of the potential predators, and 
so on. In the case of each insect, the explanation of their predation-avoiding powers 
will be just the same, regardless of their having quite different selectional histories. 
Therefore, selectional history and the functions that it grounds isn’t doing any 
explanatory work. 
The standard response to this objection27 is to follow Mayr28  in distinguishing 
between how-questions and why-questions in biology. How-questions ask how a 
biological system or structure does what it does (for example, how does the insect 
avoid being eaten?) and why-questions ask why the system or structure is the way 
that it is or why it continues to exist in a particular form (for example, why does the 
insect have a dark colouration?). Now, the response continues, appeals to selectional 
history and teleological function are not capable of answering how-questions but they 
do answer why-questions, hence they are of explanatory value. In short, the objection 
misses an important distinction and condemns appeals to teleological function for 
failing to do something that they need not do.29 My goal in this chapter is to discuss a 
particular account of the function of morality. The advocates of that account are clearly 
concerned with why-questions: why is it that we humans, in contrast to all other extant 
species, engage in moral evaluation, what aspects of our history led to the emergence 
of our capacity for moral judgement? Hence, I will assume that the appeal to the 
distinction between why-questions and how questions defeats any challenge to the 
point and legitimacy of asking the question as to the function of morality.  
I should also point out that to regard organisms as having traits that have functions 
in the teleological sense is not thereby to endorse the adaptationist view30  that most 
26 D. Davidson, ‘Knowing One’s Own Mind’ in  Proceedings and Addresses of the American 
Philosophical Association,  60, 1987, 441-458 
27 P. Godfrey-Smith, ‘Functions: Consensus Without Unity’, 1993. 
28 E. Mayr, ‘Cause and effect in biology’, Science,  134, 1961, 1501–1506. 
29 Not all philosophers who defend the appeal to teleological function in biological explanation accept 
that such functions are not relevant to answering how-questions. A recent example is K. Neander, 
‘Functional Analysis and Species Design’ in Synthese, 194, 2017, 1147-1168. 
30 G. Parker and J. Maynard Smith, ‘Optimality in Evolutionary Biology’, in Nature, 348, 1990, 27-33. 
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of an organism’s traits are adaptations or products of evolution by natural selection or 
to deny that some traits are spandrels31 or that such factors as genetic drift32 and 
constraints play an important role in evolution.33 Thus, different traits can have 
different origins and it is an open question as to whether any given trait, including the 
human capacity to moralise, has an origin such that it has a particular function.  
The etiological account of function doesn’t just apply to traits that emerge through 
a process of biological evolution for it also applies in the case of cultural evolution. 
Cultural evolution is a perfectly real phenomenon that involves the development of a 
cultural product such as a type of behaviour or an idea over time. As in the case of 
biological evolution something must be transmitted from one generation to the next. 
However, the manner of transmission will not be genetic but, rather, will involve social 
learning where one individual picks up the behaviour or idea in question from another 
individual by copying.34 Such learning is to be contrasted with individual learning 
where an individual learns something on their own by means of, for example, a 
process of trial and error. Social learning often involves teaching where, for example, 
a parent actively attempts to help their offspring to acquire a particular behaviour or 
idea, but it need not involve such teaching.35 
																																																						
 
31 A spandrel is a trait that is not an adaptation itself but is a byproduct of some other trait that is an 
adaptation. See Gould and Lewontin, ‘The Spandrels of San Marco and the Panglossian Paradigm: A 
Critique of the Adaptationist Programme’ in Proceedings of the Royal Society of London, Series B, 
205,1979, 581-598. 
 
32Genetic drift is a change in the frequency of the variants of an existing gene in a population due to 
random factors. See  A. Ariew and R. Lewontin, ‘Confusions of Fitness’ in British Journal for the 
Philosophy of Science, 55, 2004, 347-363. 
 
33 A constraint is a factor that restrains or limits evolutionary change within a population. See S. 
Gould, The Structure of Evolutionary Theory,  Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 2002. 
 
34 K. Laland, Darwin’s Unfinished Symphony: How Culture Made the Human Mind, Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2017. 
 




As with biological evolution, cultural evolution relies upon a copying process that is 
largely reliable but sometimes gives rise to ‘error’ where the product of copying is 
slightly different from the source that is copied. Thus, variants are introduced into the 
world. Sometimes these variant behaviours or ideas will be less effective than their 
forebears and will be abandoned or not copied by the next generation. But sometimes 
they will be more effective than their competitors and so will come to dominate the 
population as a result of being widely copied.  
An example will help make this concrete. Suppose that an individual hunter-
gatherer has mastery of a widely used technique for skinning small game. Another 
member of the group watches them apply this technique and attempts to copy it. 
However, the copying process isn’t perfect as the individual learns a technique that is 
slightly different from that which they attempt to copy. In particular, it is quicker to 
perform, demands less energy, wastes less meat and damages the animal skin less 
than the original copied technique. This benefits the individual; they and their family 
get to eat more, have better quality animal skin for making clothes and have more time 
and energy for other pursuits. The advantages of this new technique is not lost on the 
other members of the group who themselves begin to copy it (often accurately) so that 
it comes to be the dominant technique for skinning small game in the group usurping 
the old technique. Several generations down the line there is another inaccuracy in 
copying the technique during the learning process which, once again, has benefits so 
that a new modified version of the technique becomes the most popular within the 
group. This process of copying with the occasional beneficial modification continues 
over many generations. Thus, we have a case of the cultural evolution of a technique 
for skinning small game, a phenomenon that bears sufficient similarities to biological 
evolution to count as a case of evolution in a non-metaphorical respect. It is possible 
that processes of thinking and reflection were involved in the evolution of the skinning 
technique. For example, the modifications might not always have come about through 
unintentional mistakes; rather, they could sometimes be the products of thoughtful 
attempts to improve the old technique. Hence, cultural evolution need not be as blind, 
and dependent upon fortuitous accidents as its biological relative and this explains 
why it proceeds at a considerably faster pace.  
The existence of cultural evolution means that the etiological account of function 
can be applied to cultural products as well as to biological traits. Hence, to claim that 
morality has a specific function is not to thereby commit oneself to the view that 
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morality is an evolved biological trait. Accordingly, amongst philosophers and cognitive 
scientists who argue that morality has a cooperative function one can distinguish 
between those who think of morality as a biological adaptation36  and those who think 
of morality more in cultural terms.37  
 
Cooperation 
Now that I have explained what I mean by the terms ‘morality’ and ‘function’ I can turn 
to address the question as to the function of morality head on. Humans are social 
beings who generally live together in groups. But we are not merely social beings; in 
addition we are co-operators. Many of our endeavours involve working together with 
our fellows to achieve a common goal that we would not be able to achieve on our 
own. Of course, we are not the only animals that cooperate but the range and flexibility 
of our cooperative behaviour is unparalleled. Cooperation has enabled us to spread 
across the globe and build societies based upon rich cultures and sophisticated 
technologies that rarely stand still.  
One view which dominates the literature is that the function of morality is to facilitate 
and support cooperation. Here is a clear expression of that view from Jonathan 
Haidt:38 
 
Moral systems are interlocking sets of values, virtues, norms, practices, 
identities, institutions, technologies, and evolved psychological mechanisms 
that work together to suppress or regulate self-interest and make cooperative 
societies possible.  
 
																																																						
36 For example, R. Joyce, The Evolution of Morality, 2006 and J. Greene, Moral Tribes: Emotion, 
Reason and the Gap Between Us and Them,  London Atlantic, 2013. 
 
37 For example, M. Tomasello, A Natural History of Human Morality, 2016 and K. Sterelny, ‘Moral 
Nativism: A Skeptical Response’, in Mind and Language, 25 2010, 279-297. 
 
38 J. Haidt, The Righteous Mind: Why Good People are Divided by Politics and Religion, London, 
Penguin, 2013, 314. 
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In a similar vein Joshua Greene writes ‘morality is a set of psychological adaptations 
that allow otherwise selfish individuals to reap the benefits of cooperation.’39 
One of the most interesting, well-developed and important versions of the view that 
morality has a cooperative function has been developed by Michael Tomasello40 
(2016)  as part of a broader project concerned with the origins of human cognition.41 
It will be instructive to consider Tomasello’s perspective on morality in some detail. 
Tomasello’s goal is to provide what he calls a ‘natural history of morality’, an account 
of how morality developed in the human species. Morality is something that emerged 
in the species – and also emerges in the development of the individual –  as a result 
of a process of intellectual reflection and subsequent insight into our situation when 
we attempt to cooperate. Once it has developed, morality serves to further support 
such cooperative endeavours making them more likely to succeed. The underlying 
cooperative behaviour and the processes of reflecting upon it themselves depend 
upon evolved psychological mechanisms without which there would be no human 
morality.  However, these mechanisms did not specifically evolve for morality.  
For Tomasello morality has two components, the morality of sympathy and the 
morality of fairness. The morality of sympathy is at work when we help one of our 
fellows out of a concern for their well-being. The morality of fairness is at work when 
we make judgements concerning what is fair or just or what a person deserves based 
upon a sense of obligation that we ought to treat our fellows fairly. The morality of 
sympathy has a precursor in our great ape relatives who display sympathy towards 
their kin and friends. However, the morality of fairness is unique to humans.  
According to Tomasello, human morality emerged in two stages, both of which 
involved attempts to find new ways of cooperating in response to ecological changes. 
The first stage occurred in the region of 400,000-500,000 years ago before the arrival 
of modern humans (homo sapiens) some 150,000 years ago. Due to deforestation 
																																																						
39 J. Greene, Moral Tribes: Emotion, Reason and the Gap Between Us and Them,  London Atlantic, 
2013, 23. 
40 M. Tomasello, A Natural History of Human Morality, 2016. 
41 Seminal works in that project include M. Tomasello, Constructing a Language, Cambridge, MA, 
Harvard University Press, 2002, M. Tomasello, Origins of Human Communication, Cambridge, MA, 
MIT Press, 2008 and M. Tomasello, A Natural History of Human Thinking, Cambridge, MA, Harvard 
University Press, 2015. 
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humans came under competition for food from ground-dwelling apes and to survive 
needed to work together as pairs in hunter-gatherer ventures. Such cooperation was 
necessary for survival and in this context co-operators had a stake in one another as 
the welfare of each depended on the welfare of the other. Accordingly, any motivation 
for cheating was undercut and in helping another one did not run a major risk that 
one’s generosity would not be reciprocated. Thus, Tomasello’s portrayal of the plight 
of early human co-operators is at odds with the putatively more gloomy perspective of 
those who emphasize the problematic nature of reciprocation and the strength and 
rationality of the motivation to cheat.42 One way of putting this is to say that the plight 
of our ancestors is better represented by the Stag Hunt43– where two individuals have 
to choose between hunting for small game on their own or working together to capture 
larger prey – than the Prisoner’s Dilemma44 – where two prisoners have to decide 
whether or not to confess to a crime and/or identify their partner in crime to the 
authorities. In the Prisoner’s Dilemma, the rational thing for the individual to do is to 
identify  their partner as having committed the crime but deny their own involvement. 
In contrast, in the Stag Hunt the rational thing to do is to cooperate. 
Within the context of pairwise cooperation humans evolved psychological 
mechanisms that supported such cooperation and facilitated an appreciation of their 
plight such as to give rise to what Tomasello calls ‘second-personal morality.’ Such a 
morality holds only between pairs of co-operators whilst they are engaged in 
cooperative activities. Second-personal morality has two components, one relating to 
sympathy – as one extends one’s concern for the well-being of one’s kin and friends 
to one’s cooperative partner – and the other relating fairness – as one feels an 
obligation to treat one’s partner fairly and as they deserve to be treated.  
The central mechanisms that underpin this second-person morality are threefold: 
first, joint intentionality, second, second-personal agency and third, joint commitment. 
																																																						
42 Such gloominess is alluded to in the above quotations from Haidt and Greene which  refer to the 
challenge of selfishness and the need to suppress self-interest.  
43 B. Skyrms, The Stag Hunt and the Evolution of Social Structure, Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 2004. 
 
44 W. Poundstone, Prisoners Dilemma, Game Theory and the Puzzle of the Bomb, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 1992. 
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Joint intentionality is exercised when two individuals both share certain mental states 
and are mutually aware of that commonality.45 In the context of hunter-gatherer 
cooperation this involved mutual knowledge of a shared goal, mutual knowledge of 
the role of each partner in achieving the goal, and mutual knowledge of the ideal way 
to perform each of these roles. Such mutual knowledge is stored in what Tomasello 
calls ‘personal common ground.’ Reflecting upon their situation both cooperative 
partners come to appreciate that each constitutes an ‘I’ interacting with another –  a 
‘you’ – to form a joint agent, a ‘we.’ Further, they appreciate that their individual roles 
in the ‘we’ are interchangeable so that there is a relationship of equivalence between 
the partners.  
The second mechanism underpinning second-personal morality, second-personal 
agency, involves treating partners and potential partners with mutual respect and a 
sense of desert, evaluating and choosing partners on the basis of their collaborative 
potential, and being aware that others evaluate oneself in the same way. What is 
crucial in the exercise of second-personal agency for the emergence of morality is the 
individual’s recognition that in virtue of their equivalence with their cooperative partner 
both deserve respect from the other should they perform their role in line with the 
mutually known role ideals.  
The third mechanism involved in second-personal morality, joint commitment, is 
exercised when an individual identifies with a larger body – that is, the ‘we’ formed 
with their cooperative partner – and explicitly grants authority to that larger body so as 
to accept being judged by its standards as shared in common ground and to take 
responsibility for judging themselves and others by those standards. Thus, as a result 
of making joint commitments, individuals judge both themselves and their fellows 
impartially rather than in a self-serving manner, something that is crucial if their 
behaviour is to be based on a sense of how they ought to behave rather than being 
merely strategic.  
Second-personal morality constitutes a very local form of morality that only holds 
between collaborative partners whilst they cooperate. However, with further social 
changes ‘a full-blown, group minded, cultural morality of “objective” right and wrong 
applying to everyone in all situations’ (2016: 84) began to emerge some 150,000 years 
																																																						
45 An appeal to joint intentionality is a recurring theme of Tomasello’s output. For example, it is central 
to Tomasello’s (2002) anti-Chomskyan account of language acquisition.  
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ago. The crucial social changes involved the formation of cultural groups that brought 
together small groups of foragers in order to protect them from competitor groups. 
Within such cultural groups each individual entered into a relationship of 
interdependence with many other people, most of whom they would not know directly 
and could only recognise as a fellow group member on the basis of their behaving in 
a manner characteristic of group members. With the formation of cultural groups the 
morality of sympathy was scaled up as individuals came to feel sympathy towards all 
other members of their cultural group.  
To operate in a cultural context the mechanisms of joint intentionality, second-
personal agency and joint commitment that underpin second-personal morality 
needed to be scaled up to those of collective intentionality, cultural agency and moral 
self-governance and it is through the exercise of these mechanisms that a fully-fledged 
public morality of justice and fairness emerged. 
Collective intentionality involves members of a cultural group having mutual 
knowledge of the conventional practices of that culture and of the ideal way to perform 
the various roles people perform within the group. Such knowledge constitutes cultural 
common ground and enables individuals to interact effectively with those who they do 
not know intimately. For, they will know how they are generally expected to behave in 
any given cultural context and how the other participants in that context can be relied 
upon to behave, be it – to use contemporary examples – a supermarket, an academic 
conference, a rock concert, a job interview or a blind date.46  
Cultural agency, the second component underpinning group-minded cultural 
morality, is a mechanism for controlling potentially uncooperative members of the 
group and rests upon social norms that specify how we must behave in various 
situations to be cooperative. Some of these norms are merely conventional but some 
have a moral character that ‘comes from the underlying second-person morality of 
sympathy and harm, fairness and unfairness, in which the norm is grounded.’47  A 
norm against stealing would be an example of a norm that has a moral character in 
																																																						
46 In tying cultural conventions to mutual knowledge, Tomasello is allying himself to a view of 
conventions following in the tradition most associated with D. Lewis, Convention: A Philosophical 
Study, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press,1969 and in stark opposition to R. Millikan, 
‘Language Conventions Made Simple’ in Journal of Philosophy, 95, 1998, 161-180. 
 
47 M. Tomasello, A Natural History of Human Morality, 2016, 100. 
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virtue of its relationship to second-personal morality in contrast to norms of etiquette. 
An important element of cultural agency is an evolved tendency to enforce social 
norms on others even when we are an unaffected bystander.  
Moral self-governance, the third component underpinning group-minded cultural 
morality, is a mechanism for self-regulation in a social context that relies upon what 
Tomasello (following Korsgaard,48 calls ‘reflective endorsement’ along with  guilt. 
Reflective endorsement occurs when an individual, in the course of action planning, 
reflects on whether a particular goal or value is a good one to pursue. Guilt arises 
when an individual reflects retrospectively on her actions and judges that she has done 
something wrong and so deserves punishment. Such moral self-governance is 
underpinned by an identification with the creators of the social norms in terms of which 
the individual judges her actual and potential behaviour so that those norms are seen 
as something that ‘we’ created for our own benefit.  
With respect to the development of morality in the individual, Tomasello sketches a 
process that resembles that of the emergence of morality in the species. Thus, a child 
first develops a second-personal morality between the ages of 1 and 3 where they 
help spontaneously, share equally with others and honour and expect their fellows to 
honour joint commitments. It is only from the age of 3 that children develop a group- 
minded cultural morality that reflects the norms of their cultural group. But once such 
a morality has developed, the second-personal morality is not abandoned; rather, the 
group-minded cultural morality rests on top of a simpler second-personal morality and 
their demands can sometimes pull in opposite directions giving rise to internal moral 
conflict.  
Several points are worth noting about Tomasello’s natural history of morality. First, 
Tomasello does think that biological evolution is at work; the three mechanisms 
involved work in second-personal morality and their scaled up analogues that operate 
in group-minded cultural morality are either biological adaptations or are underpinned 
by biological adaptations. However, they are not adaptations specifically for morality 
but for cooperation more generally. In this respect, his view of morality echoes his view 
of language developed in Constructing a Language49 according to which the creation 
																																																						
48 C. Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1996. 
 
49 M. Tomasello, Constructing a Language, 2002. 
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and learning of language depends upon the more general mechanisms of mind-
reading and pattern recognition.  
Second, Tomasello portrays the emergence of morality as a heavy duty intellectual 
process where individuals reflect upon their situation as they attempt to cooperate and 
so come to view that situation in certain moral terms, for example, as one where their 
fellows merit being treated in certain ways, or as one where we are all obliged to 
behave in certain specific ways. 
Third, for Tomasello the specific content of an individual’s moral outlook will reflect 
their experiences. This is particularly true of group-minded cultural morality as it 
requires the individual to come to know the cultural conventions of her community, 
something that in turn depends upon cultural transmission and learning. Accordingly, 
members of different cultures can have different moral outlooks notwithstanding the 
fact that their respective outlooks will always relate to sympathy and fairness. For 
example, as the experiments involved in playing the Ultimatum Game50 indicate, 
members of different cultures hold different views as to what is fair and what is not.51 
For example, some think that fairness requires an equal distribution of resources 
whereas others think that it is fair to distribute resources on the basis of merit.  
Fourth, Tomasello thinks that group selection is at work in the moral domain. That 
is, the moral outlook of one cultural group might outperform that of another in virtue of 
facilitating more effective cooperation between its members with the upshot that the 
less cooperative group might die out or get assimilated into the more cooperative one. 
Tomasello shares the widespread scepticism as to the significance of group selection 
as a biological force. However, he follows Richerson and Boyd52 in postulating a 
50 In the Ultimatum game one player, the proposer, is given a sum of money. Their task is to offer the 
other player, the responder, of portion of this money. If the offer is accepted then the money is split 
accordingly. If the responder rejects the offer (for example, on the grounds that it is too small to count 
as a fair division of the money) then neither players gets to keep any of the money.  
51 J. Henrich, R. Boyd, S. Bowles, C. Camerer, E. Fehr, H. Gintis, and R. McElreath. ‘In Search of 
Homo Economicus: Behavioral Experiments in 15 Small-Scale Societies’,  American Economic 
Review, 91, 2001, 73-78. 
52 P. Richerson and R. Boyd, Not By Genes Alone: How Culture Transformed Human Evolution, 
Chicago, Chicago University Press, 2005.   
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process of cultural group selection. The implications of this is that the specifics of an 
individual’s moral outlook will typically reflect the identity of her cultural group and its 




Morality and Cooperation 
Should we be convinced by Tomasello’s perspective on the function of morality? I am 
sceptical for several reasons. A first objection relates to the power of moral judgement 
to make a relevant impact on our behaviour. In the discussion of the nature of functions 
above I argued that for a trait to have a particular function it must have produced 
relevant effects in its history, effects that benefitted organisms that had the trait. 
Applied to the present case, this implies that for morality to have a cooperative 
function, past individuals who engaged in moral judgement must have been more 
effective co-operators than their fellows who did not morally judge or, alternatively, 
more effective co-operators than they otherwise would have been had they not morally 
judged. Put bluntly, moral judgment must have made a difference to how our ancestors 
behaved and that difference must have had a positive impact on their cooperative 
endeavours. But how plausible is it that moral judgement had such a positive impact? 
I share with Tomasello an assumption that humans are generally rational and 
capable of working out how best to behave in order to satisfy their interests, goals and 
desires. In other words, we are generally effective at strategic reasoning and this has 
a positive impact on how we behave.  Very often morality and self interest point in the 
same direction; that it to say, that what an individual would do if they they were acting 
rationally out of self-interest would be just the same as what they would do if they were 
acting on the basis of moral considerations. For example, morality demands that I 
prepare thoroughly for all the classes that I teach and am generally helpful towards 
my students. But so does self-interest as a poorly prepared and unhelpful teacher will 
receive negative evaluations from their students which will in turn lead to 
disapprobation from their managers and colleagues that can harm their long-term job 
prospects.  
We saw that in order to undercut the idea that humans are prone to cheating and 
defection Tomasello emphasises the fact that co-operators have a stake in one 
another. Indeed, he sometimes characterises his position as the stakeholder model of 
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morality. Thus, for example, it is in the interests of a hunter-gatherer to give food to 
their foraging partner as they have a stake in that partner’s well-being. This is 
important for Tomasello for it explains how the mechanisms underpinning morality can 
evolve be it by biological or cultural means. But if we have a stake in one another’s 
well-being then the demands of self-interest and those of morality will typically agree 
just as I have claimed. For example, suppose a hunter-gatherer retrieves a rabbit from 
a trap they have set with a foraging partner. What the morality of fairness and justice 
demands is that they share the prey with their partner. It would be unfair to fail to inform 
the partner and consume the rabbit alone. But it would also be ill-advised from a 
strategic perspective. For, if one’s partner goes hungry they may be too weak to be of 
much use on the next foraging trip. Or if the act of unfairness is discovered the partner 
might break off the partnership undermining the selfish individual’s future food 
gathering prospects.  
My point here is not that there is no difference between acting out of self-interest 
and acting on the basis of moral considerations. For, as Tomasello argues, motives 
matter when it comes to morality. For example, to be a moral agent or to act out of 
one’s moral convictions one has to do what one does out of a sense of obligation and 
not for purely strategic reasons. It is for this reason that he denies that chimps are 
moral agents; even when chimps seemingly behave in line with the demands of 
morality (for example, when they putatively treat a fellow chimp justly) they do so for 
strategic reasons.  
The upshot of all this is that the capacity to make moral judgements and act on them 
couldn’t have made any difference to the behaviour of our ancestors who were already 
engaged in strategic reasoning. Developing a capacity to make moral judgements and 
act on them would have been akin to putting on braces when your trousers were firmly 
secured by a belt. But, given the nature of functions,  for morality to have a cooperative 
function the capacity to make and act on moral judgements must have made a relevant 
difference to the behaviour of our ancestors; it must have made them behave in ways 
that enhanced their cooperative endeavours, behaviour that they otherwise would not 
have engaged in (or behaviour that their strategic but non-moralistic fellows didn’t 
engage in). Consequently, on the stakeholder model, morality could not have secured 
a cooperative function.  
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A potential response to this objection has been developed by Joyce53 in the context 
of defending his view that morality is a biological adaptation.54 What Joyce claims is 
that we are subject to weakness of will; we often fail to do things that we want to do 
and know are in our best interests and we have a particular problem delaying 
gratification. For example, I might have an extra glass of wine when I know I will regret 
it the following day or give that 5-mile run a miss on a cold and rainy day despite 
supposedly being on a fitness drive. Thus, in cooperative situations we run the risk of 
failing to do what we know is in our best interests so that our cooperative endeavours 
break down. The advantage of morality, according to Joyce, is that moral judgements 
have a ‘practical clout’ that regular intentions or desires do not have; in other words, it 
is much harder to do something that one judges to be wrong or fail to do something 
that one judges to be right than it is in the cases where one’s motivations to act are 
provided by mental states that do not have a moral character. This raises the question 
of how moral judgements have such motivational force; why is it harder to ignore a 
moral judgment than a regular non-moral strategic judgement? Joyce provides the 
familiar answer that moral judgements have an emotional component (without being 
purely emotional states) and it is this that provides them with their motivational force.  
This raises  the question of whether moral judgments are sufficiently powerful with 
respect to action; do they systematically outperform self-interested reasoning in terms 
of causing us to act. If not, then Joyce’s argument collapses and we are left with the 
conclusion that morality doesn’t have a cooperative function.  
I am sceptical of the power of moral judgment to drive behaviour for the following 
reasons. First, it is almost a truism that humans often behave in ways that conflict with 
their moral judgements and convictions and this is reflected in the fact that so many of 
our moral judgements are negative in tone and involve judging that someone did 
something that they shouldn’t have done and knew full well that they shouldn’t have 
done. Second, some cognitive scientists55 question whether reasoning plays a 
substantial role in arriving at moral judgements. Whether or not they are right, my 
																																																						
53 R. Joyce, The Evolution of Morality, 2006. 
54 R. Frank, Passions with Reasons: The Strategic Role of the Emotions, New York, Norton, 1988, 
develops a similar line of argument. 
55 For example, J. Haidt, ‘The Emotional Dog and its Rational Tails: A Social Intuitionist Approach to 
Moral Judgment’, Psychological Review, 108, 2001, 814-834. 
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experiences suggest that people often engage in reasoning to get themselves out of 
acting on the basis of a rather inconvenient moral judgement or injunction. For 
example, I have heard people who are morally in favour of giving to charity justifying 
their not giving to charity on the grounds that the charity in question can’t be relied 
upon to spend donations wisely.  And I’ve heard people who condemn major 
corporations for exploiting loopholes in the tax system justify their own minor tax 
indiscretions on the grounds that the sums involved are trifling. In short, we are rather 
effective at employing reasoning to escape the behavioural demands of moral 
judgement when acting on the basis of that judgement clashes with self-interest.  
Third, in case the foregoing sounds a little too anecdotal, there is important 
experimental data that suggests that in those cases where morality and self-interest 
point in the same direction, it is self-interest that is driving behaviour and when they 
point in different directions self-interest often wins out. Bateson et al (2006) conducted 
an experiment in a University common room which operated an honesty box system 
for paying for tea and coffee. A clearly visible notice was displayed at head height near 
to the tea and coffee-making equipment and supplies. As well as indicating the prices 
the notice had an image printed upon it which alternated from week to week between 
flowers and a pair of eyes. What Bateson et al. discovered were that contributions to 
the honesty box were considerably higher when the displayed image was of a pair of 
eyes than when it was of a flower. They interpreted this as indicating that the image of 
the eyes reminded individuals that they were potentially being watched and that their 
reputation would be damaged by a failure to contribute to the honesty box. Thus, a 
self-interested desire to protect one’s reputation rather than a genuine concern for the 
public good was the key behavioural driver.  
A second objection to Tomasello’s perspective on the function of morality involves 
questioning the need for morality to drive our cooperative behaviour. In the previous 
objection I warned against the danger of overestimating the impact of moral judgement 
on our behaviour. What I am warning against now is the danger of underestimating 
the power of non-moral factors to influence our behaviour. Humans are cultural beings 
and an important aspect of any culture is a rich network of conventions and non-moral 
norms that govern behaviour. As Tomasello is keen to point out, human individuals 
are very effective at learning such conventions and norms (which are stored in what 
he calls cultural common ground) and once learned such conventions and norms have 
a powerful hold on our behaviour. For example, I have internalised the British norms 
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surrounding queuing and slavishly follow them without reflection whenever I encounter 
situations where they apply. Sometimes I holiday abroad in places where I know full 
well that the British queuing conventions do not apply. Nevertheless, I cannot help but 
queue like a Brit and invariably end up waiting a long time to be served. Similarly, I 
have internalised the convention of standing on the right of escalators when travelling 
on the London underground thereby leaving a clear passageway on the left for 
travellers in a hurry. I know full well that this convention doesn’t apply everywhere.  
Nevertheless, when I find myself on an escalator in another context I cannot help but 
stand on the right and find it almost emotionally painful to stand on the left. What these 
examples show is the power of conventions to direct our behaviour.  
If we are so prone to pick up conventions and they have such a hold on us then why 
would we need morality to support our cooperative endeavours? Surely, a body of 
conventions would be far more effective. For example, to get people to help their less 
fortunate fellows all you need is a convention of helping the less fortunate rather than 
a capacity to judge that it is morally good to help those less fortunate than oneself. It 
might be objected that if we did have and learn such conventions and routinely acted 
on the basis of them, then we would have learned a moral norm and be acting on the 
basis of moral considerations. However, such an objection would miss the important 
point that moral agency requires not merely acting in accord with moral norms but 
doing what one does for moral reasons (for example, out of a sense of obligation). 
Thus, if the mechanisms that underpin ‘doing the right thing’ are the same as those 
that underpin the following of a non-moral convention then one would not have learned 
a moral norm or be acting on the basis of moral considerations. In sum, there is reason 
to believe that  we have a psychology that is such that our cooperative endeavours 
would be better suited by learning and following non-moral conventions than by 
exercising our capacity for moral judgment.   
 
Conclusion 
Michael Tomasello has developed a particularly detailed and sophisticated version of 
the popular view that morality has a cooperative function that promises to dominate 
the literature for years to come. Drawing upon an account of the nature of moral 
judgement and of teleological function (which explains both how a biological trait or a 
cultural product could have a function) developed in the first half of this chapter I raised 
a number of objections to Tomasello’s perspective. In particular, I argued that moral 
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judgment does not plausibly have the required impact upon behaviour to accrue a 
cooperative function; typically, the demands of morality agree with those of self-
interest and where they clash it is usually the demands self-interest grounded in our 
strategic reasoning capacities that win out. Moreover, given the human capacity to 
learn conventions and the power that learned conventions have, there are far more 
effective means of ensuring that we behave in a way that supports our cooperative 
endeavours.   
By focussing on a particular version of the idea that morality  has a cooperative 
function I haven’t settled the question as to what the function of morality is or, 
indeed, whether it has any function at all. Thus, someone convinced by my line of 
argument is faced with a series of options. The first option is that of developing an 
alternative account of function that is not grounded in evolution (be it biological or 
cultural) and arguing that that account applies to morality thereby grounding a 
particular function. The second option involves arguing for an alternative non-
cooperative function for morality that is grounded in evolution. The third option is that 
of rejecting the idea that morality has a function. I will leave the question of which of 
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